Dive Boat Fire

Discovery":2t9z3ggq said:
https://ktla.com/2019/09/02/crews-r...e-on-boat-near-santa-cruz-island-coast-guard/

We used to dive from the Conception each fall in the 1990's. As I remember, there was only one below decks access/egress to the main deck.

Sad.

https://www.truthaquatics.com/conception/

The bunk layout on the lower deck.

Agree with the need for a standing watch, but if they were charging batteries in or near the mid-deck galley area and the people were below that with only one egress which was through the galley area and seeing how quickly energetic a lithium ion battery fire can be, it might not have been possible to get out anyway ?

Seems to me that out of 30+ people in the sleeping area someone would always be marginally awake anyway to spot a fire in the area above. But how do you get out?

Need better planning to avoid this impossibly risky situation.

Joe. :disgust
 
thataway":1mpxm8k6 said:
I got a phone call from a delivery skipper, who is a friend, about this incident. One of his points was that a fire watch is mandatory on such vessels:

46 CFR § 185.410 - Watchmen.
§ 185.410 Watchmen.
The owner, charterer, master, or managing operator of a vessel carrying overnight passengers shall have a suitable number of watchmen patrol throughout the vessel during the nighttime, whether or not the vessel is underway, to guard against, and give alarm in case of, a fire, man overboard, or other dangerous situation.

There is nothing about the size of vessel, or number of passengers--this is a requirement period.

He was of the impression (for several reasons) that the crew had little if any fire fighting training. One point he made is apparently someone opened the door to the galley--and that would give more oxygen to the inflatable gas and material.

Many of my professional mariner have mandated fire fighting training on a regular basis--just as CPR and First air certification is also required.

The various types of li ion batteries have different risks of explosion or over heating. As many technical items they must be respected. I have 200 amp hours of 12 volt LiFePO4 batteries under my bunk. Perhaps I should put a fire suppression system there? But Have redundant temperatures sensors from the battery chargers which serve these batteries. Also the large batteries, have internal protection from thermal run away--which usually happens either during high capacity charging or discharge. (Ie the battery conducitn shuts down internally if the temp or current exceeds a certain limit. Small batteries don't have these type of devices.

We won't see the final report for 12 to 18 months. But CG has issued several bulletins about standing fire watches, and about safety precautions with any battery charging system.
All crew members from Truth Aquatics are trained to use fire fighting equipment onboard their boats. There is no door, repeat, NO door to the galley/salon while people are onboard. Sliding doors at the rear of the galley are closed when the boat is empty at the dock.
 
thataway":1swztecp said:
... Also the large batteries, have internal protection from thermal run away--which usually happens either during high capacity charging or discharge. (Ie the battery conducitn shuts down internally if the temp or current exceeds a certain limit. Small batteries don't have these type of devices.
....

If the battery shorts internally (aka 787 batteries) there's not much you can do to shut them down. That's why the 787 batteries are now housed in a big steel box.

While personal device batteries can overheat and catch fire from charging, they are more likely to run away due to physical damage (i.e. internal shorts). This is why the FAs on commercial flights say not to move the seats if you drop your phone so it doesn't somehow get crunched and set the battery off.
 
I was told, but I have not confirmed it, that two men were awake on the bridge. They may not have been as close to sleeping quarters as regs require.
 
If memory serves correctly. The stairway to the sleeping area was open without any doors. The galley doors on the rear of the boat were 8' to 10' wide and were always open. I remember a briefing on the location of the escape hatch, but the hatch was quite small and not easily accessed.

Dixie and I looked at some old high 8 videos over the last few days. There were a few taken of diving from the Conception. Lots of good dives and good times. We would have up to 9 or 10 family members on the Conception dive trips.

I remember Truth Aquatics as being a first-class operation. We always booked in the fall. Trying to be there for the opening of the Lobster Diving Season. Lots of night dives. Memories of younger days.
 
The way i interpret the law is that there should be two people on watch; a lookout a/p rule 5 of the COLREGS and roving fire watch a/p 46cfr subchapter t. The normal maritime fireround happens every hour (uscg, navy, merchant marine). This fire consumed the salon in 40 minutes. Sure, the lawyers will prove negligence on the lack of a fire watchmen but i'm not convinced, given the timeline, that it would have made much of a difference.

Also note that subchapter t doesn't make an allowance for remote monitoring of spaces like subchapters for larger vessels. I do feel this could have made a difference.
 
As much as we would like to defend friends, or associates we have good times with, in this case, some very serious mistakes were made, and a number of lives lost. A question I pose is which marine professional should be held to a higher standard, or have more training; the master of a 85 foot Dive boat carrying passengers for hire, or the captain of an ocean going tug boat? In reality the master of the dive boat has more responsibility for lives. Yet I believe that the master of an ocean going tug has far more training requirements.

I wonder what "Trained to fight fires" means, in comparison to the codes for training which are required for the International Convention on Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers – (STCW Convention – and its associated Code). For example the crew of the tug has to take a 4 day fire fighting course every few years. The tug boat should have two persons on watch at all times--even at anchor when on standby duty. Watch does not mean sitting in a chair reading a book, it means roving thru the boat checking all systems and persons on a regular frequent schedule.

I was certified by NAUI in the early to mid 60s by Sam Lecocq and John Cronin was my PADI instructor in the later 60's. I began free diving in 1946; SCUBA was so liberating. I'll admit an aversion to the cattle dive boats. I monitored a abalone bed behind some kelp and under a ledge, at Arrow Point, where I took enough for a meal now and then for years. One day I saw a "dive boat" anchored there after SCUBA came on the scene. I went there next day. There was not one abalone of any size left. I watched that area for many years, and it never recovered as of the late 90's The over harvesting is what killed the abalone population at Catalina. A pink ab at Catalina takes 14 years on an average to reach legal size. The, at one time more common green, takes 14 to 21 years or black can take 20 to 30 years. I mention this because the dive boat operators were more interested in a profit, than protecting the resources.

I was involved with the implication of early diving regulations in S. Calif. At one time I had pronounced dead several teens who had instructions in their high schools, and then were taken by cattle boats to dive Catalina. The crews ( late 1960's to early 70's) were not prepared with a skiff or rescue vessel, underwater recall alarm, proficient dive masters and adequate instruction of the divers. All of these safety features were finally incorporated into the organizations locally and be came the rules in Los Angles County. Death on diving expeditions is very personal with me; I have seen too many accidents. I also have a friend who owns a large dive boat in the LA area, so I understand the the issues involved with crew retention, and the difficulties of of running the business.

When I came to Pensacola, where there is a very active (and close) diving community; their safety features were not up to date. I joined and chaired the Marine Resource committee and was able to implement better safety standards.

Although we would prefer otherwise, bad things can happen very fast on boats at sea--even at anchor. Fire at sea is very high on that list of catastrophies, and there are many factors in preventing it. Unfortunately a vessel passing "Coast Guard Inspection" may not mean state of the art. What was the fire alarm system? Smoke, CO detection, heat detection? How about video surveillance, (very common on yachts these days)? What means of suppression was built into the boat? Sprinkler system, Containment bulkheads, and fire doors? How much instruction was given to the passengers ref fire suppression, escape techniques, and safety precautions? Was there crew members qualified and equipped to go into a room with hot gasses, or a fire to affect rescue? Some of these will come out in the final reports.

The crew members and owner of the operation have to live the rest of their lives with the consequences. There will be potential criminal as well as civil legal proceedings against multiple parties, probably to include the organizers of the trip, although they had no control over the situation.

We should all learn from this tragedy--have adequate fire fighting gear aboard our boats (We have 4 extinguishers, of various types). Have 3 CO detector, and smoke/fire alarms. Do routine inspections of fittings, especially electrical, and fuel lines. Know your escape routes, and have a plan. On our larger boats we had engine room fire suppression systems, a written plan for fire, which every new guest had to read (along with other info). We had several heat detectors, as well as the CO and Smoke detectors. Be safe!
 
I came across this NTSB report on another passenger carrying boat--entirely different type of fire, but reading the report and recommendations is enlightening.

here
 
as usual Bob, you're pretty spot on. These guys are mostly STCW exempt from my understanding. Also the STCW firefighting classes wouldn't really help as these vessels don't have much in the way of fire fighting gear; not turn outs or scba's. Really, subchapter t is pretty meager. With the amazing fire fighting/ technology available today the requirements should be a bit more stringent.

Your point about the requirements on the tug captain vs the dive boat captain are correct. It really doesn't makes sense.
 
Unfortunately, "life" got in the way of my monitoring and editing my post last night about a NSTB investigation of a fire on a T Boat about 18 months ago.

The NSTB investigation.

I also did more reading, including posts by a naval architect who designs commercial vessels and yachts, who pointed out that the classification standards many yachts exceed the less than 100 tons, 49 or less overnight and 150 or less day passenger boat:
The 46 CFR Subchapter T - SMALL PASSENGER VESSELS (UNDER 100 GROSS TONS

The requirements are appalling; the design and building industry seems well aware of this. Even if NSTB recommends changes, the Coast Guard is free to either comply or not.

As I understand it, the Conception did have at least one fire hydrant, and a hose in complience with the regulations. It is seen on the deck side of the main saloon structure in multiple photos. The thought haunted me last night, as to how that main could have been pressurized with a fire aboard. Many pumps require an engine to be started, or a pump energized off the already running gen set. What controls were functional and available in the pilot house for this? The NA felt that a fogging system would have been effective--and should be required in passenger spaces. That is only speculation.

Another thought was that even if a passenger could be evacuated every 15 seconds (4/min) it would take almost 10 minutes to have evacuated the sleeping quarters. Seeing photos of the. actual escape area on both the Conception and Vision, made me wonder how I could have found and then gotten into the position to open the secondary escape hatch?

It is said that these dive boats have been operating for over 40 years without major problems. (The Conception apparently was stolen, and run on the beach off Vandenberg Air Force Base, then rebuilt in the 2005 era.). I have no idea of number of dive related morbidity or mortality, if any. I do know that in the eras of 60's and 70's in S. Calif. there were a number of unreported diving medical incidents in Southern Calif.. (often it is difficult to sort out what were primary medical issues vs the true diving incident. For example it is interesting to note that DAN's reports that about 75% of SCUBA divers were either over weight or obese by MBI.) I suspect that DAN's stastatics are probably under reported. My experience in Pensacola more recently showed gross under reporting. Part was the nature of the area. I found a number of cases of dive accidents where the patient went "home" and was treated over 100 miles from the site of the accident, in an area where there was no mandatory requirement reporting or categorization of diving accidents in the ER's or private Dr's office. Other divers have transient symptoms, and don't want to stop diving, so they don't report symptoms, and continue to dive. Overall, diving appears to be as safe as driving your car.
 
The Small Passenger Boat S afety act was passed by Congress today:. This was direct action prompted by the. tragedy on the Conception.

The Small Passenger Vessel Safety Act of 2019 directs the Coast Guard to implement safety reforms to small passenger vessels to prevent a similar disaster in the future. The Coast Guard will be required to prescribe additional regulations to secure the safety of individuals and property on board certain small passenger vessels including the addition of interconnected fire detection in all areas to which passengers have access, including dining areas, sleeping quarters, and lounges. The law also requires vessels to have no less than two avenues of escape to different parts of the boat. It also includes requirements for marine firefighting training programs to improve crew member training and proficiency; and mandates safety standards for the handling, storage, and operation of flammable items, such as lithium-ion batteries.

“The Conception boat fire was a tragedy that could have been prevented had stronger safety measures been in place,” Senator Feinstein said in a released statement when the bill was first introduced in December 2019. “We must ensure that small passenger vessels have the right safety measures in place to prevent disasters at sea. This bill addresses the specific conditions that are being investigated as causes of the Conception fire, conditions that exist on hundreds of similar vessels in operation today.”

A National Transportation Safety Board investigation into the fire, released after the bill was first introduced, found a lack of U.S. Coast Guard regulations for smoke detection in all accommodation spaces in small vessels with overnight accommodations and the configuration of exits from the bunkroom contributed to the fire and its deadliness.
 
thataway":20dhnba6 said:
The Small Passenger Boat S afety act was passed by Congress today:. This was direct action prompted by the. tragedy on the Conception.

The Small Passenger Vessel Safety Act of 2019 directs the Coast Guard to implement safety reforms to small passenger vessels to prevent a similar disaster in the future. The Coast Guard will be required to prescribe additional regulations to secure the safety of individuals and property on board certain small passenger vessels including the addition of interconnected fire detection in all areas to which passengers have access, including dining areas, sleeping quarters, and lounges. The law also requires vessels to have no less than two avenues of escape to different parts of the boat. It also includes requirements for marine firefighting training programs to improve crew member training and proficiency; and mandates safety standards for the handling, storage, and operation of flammable items, such as lithium-ion batteries.

“The Conception boat fire was a tragedy that could have been prevented had stronger safety measures been in place,” Senator Feinstein said in a released statement when the bill was first introduced in December 2019. “We must ensure that small passenger vessels have the right safety measures in place to prevent disasters at sea. This bill addresses the specific conditions that are being investigated as causes of the Conception fire, conditions that exist on hundreds of similar vessels in operation today.”

A National Transportation Safety Board investigation into the fire, released after the bill was first introduced, found a lack of U.S. Coast Guard regulations for smoke detection in all accommodation spaces in small vessels with overnight accommodations and the configuration of exits from the bunkroom contributed to the fire and its deadliness.

I have to read the final version. The first one carbajal was pushing was just a handful of STCW deepsea regs being thrown at the small passenger vessel industry. The Truth and Vision, sister ships to the ill fated Conception have just sold to a kayak guide outfit out of Santa Barbara. I've researched the owners who don't have a professional maritime background that i could see. I really want to see those boats keep running; they've already been retrofitted with fwd escape hatches by a shipwright friend of mine. I was going to cold call the new owners and see if they want a consultant.
 
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